Re: PHK's MD5 might not be slow enough anymore

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From
Garance A Drosihn <drosih@rpi.edu>
Date
28 Jan 2010 21:57:20
Subject
Re: PHK's MD5 might not be slow enough anymore
Message-ID
p06240808c787b7763922@[128.113.24.47]

In reply to

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At 1:09 PM -0800 1/28/10, Xin LI wrote:
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>On 2010/01/28 12:18, Chris Palmer wrote:
>> For backwards compatibility, which do people prefer: Creating a new $N$
>> prefix every time we re-tune the algorithm, or using a new notation to say
>> how many times this password was hashed? For example: $1.1000$, $1.100000$,
>> et c.?
>
>I'd vote for $1.nnnn$, as a good side effect it would be tunable by the
>administrators who want to fine tune the round number as need.

Might want to make it something like $1.nnn.bbb$, so the admin can specify
the number of bits as well as the number of rounds. And then pick some
algorithm where those two values make sense. :-)


By going for something tunable, users don't HAVE to change their password
the moment the sysadmin decides that it's time for better protection. The
sysadmin can change the numbers used when the user changes their password,
and then gradually transition everyone to the stronger encryption.

It also means that users could decide to use stronger encryption if they
are willing to wait for it, without the sysadmin needing to do anything.

--
Garance Alistair Drosehn = gad@gilead.netel.rpi.edu
Senior Systems Programmer or gad@freebsd.org
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or drosih@rpi.edu


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