Re: PHK's MD5 might not be slow enough anymore

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From
Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@des.no>
Date
1 Feb 2010 13:25:51
Subject
Re: PHK's MD5 might not be slow enough anymore
Message-ID
86sk9l5bq9.fsf@ds4.des.no


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Dan Lukes <dan@obluda.cz> writes:
> Mike Andrews <mandrews@bit0.com> writes:
> > There is probably a login.conf knob to raise the default number of
> > rounds beyond 2^4.
> No. The standard way of password change flow trough pam_unix.c.
>
> It call crypt(new_pass, salt) where salt is pseudo-random sequence. As
> such salt doesn't start with a magic, the default algorithm is
> selected. If it si blowfish, then crypt_blowfish(key, salt) is called.

Mike is mostly right and you are mostly wrong. The default algorithm is
indeed controlled by login.conf and auth.conf, although there is no way
to specify the number of rounds.

DES
--
Dag-Erling Smrgrav - des@des.no


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