In message <199807202352.RAA27271@lariat.lariat.org>, Brett Glass wrote:
} Thousands (maybe tens or hundreds of thousands) of systems have been
} potentially compromised because that code was in the FreeBSD Ports
} library. I'd find it hard to believe that such a scheme would do
} anything but improve the odds that the hole would be closed.
I still think you're just ranting. What does it mean to "have been
potentially compromised" anyway?
} And, no, CVSup is not an answer. On production machines, you don't
} want to CVSup to the latest version -- you just want to pick up
} known good patches for significant problems.
Maybe you've been working too long and too hard cleaning up after your
breakin. CVSup would work fine for what you're talking about, you'd just
have to have a different tag which only got "known good patches for
significant problems". Of course, this would still have the problem of
being a "pull" model, so you'd have to check "often enough". You'd
also have to be damn sure you trusted the person doing the checkins, and
you'd have to be sure that you were in fact talking to the server you
decided to trust. And you'd have to be certain that you trusted the patch
as applied, both that it solved the problem it was meant to solve, and
that it didn't introduce some other bogosity. Most of these should be
red flags shouting out that you don't really want to automate this
process, but I don't imagine that'll slow you down much.
I don't have solutions to all those problems, but then again I'm
not the one jumping up and down saying that we've got to have solutions
to this problem affecting "maybe tens or hundreds of thousands" of systems.
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